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Comments on the Draft Commission Notice on the notion of State aid 
pursuant to Article 107 (1) TFEU  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2014_state_aid_notion/draft_
guidance_en.pdf 
Centre of European Law, King’s College London 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1. The Centre of European Law at King’s College London welcomes the initiative 
of the Commission to issue a notice on the notion of State aid. There are two 
reasons for which this is an important regulatory development. First, the notice 
increases legal certainty for businesses and national administrations alike. Second, 
the Commission is undertaking pioneering work by including in the notice important 
guidance on fiscal policy. 
1.2. The notice fulfils a pedagogical function, by offering an explanation of Article 
107 (1) case law, and it also streamlines policy developments in the sector. Such 
task is not an easy one, and the Commission should be commended for its efforts. 
Given the complex body of case law in this area, it is understandable that the 
Commission wished to be at times selective in its references to Court judgments. 
The following comments should be therefore understood as an attempt to outline 
specific points that might benefit from supplementary clarification.  
1.3. As a general point, we would like to stress that the explanations with regards 
to the decisional practice of the Commission and the references to Commission 
decisions throughout the draft notice are certainly very useful. However as 
mentioned in paragraph 3 of the Draft notice, the Commission aims at clarifying its 
understanding of the notion of aid, in line with the case law of the Courts. It is thus 
surprising that there are many instances throughout the notice where the 
Commission refers to its own decisional practice, without referring to the case law 
as well. We consider that certain sections and paragraphs might be rendered 
stronger by relying on the judgments of the EU Courts. Alternatively it should be 
made clear that reference to Commission practice is merely illustrative or 
explanatory of a certain specific issue. Throughout our comments below we will 
point out to the particular instances where further references might be necessary.  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2428771 
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2. THE LEGAL VALUE OF THE NOTICE: 
2.1. It is important to spell out in clearer terms what the legal value of the notice 
is. Undoubtedly, the notice is an Article 288 (5) instrument, deprived of legally 
binding force. Nonetheless, it should not be forgotten that the Court of Justice of 
the European Union stressed that such instruments are binding on the discretion of 
the European Commission,1 which cannot depart from the provisions of notices and 
communications without giving reasons that are consistent with the principles of 
legitimate expectations, legal certainty, or equality.2 Consequently, we suggest 
adding to paragraph three the following sentence: 
‘When deciding on State aid cases, the Commission will be guided by this 
notice, and can depart from the text thereof only after giving reasons that 
are consistent with the principle of legal certainty and equality.’ 
2.2. In order to stress the important contribution made by the notice towards 
enhancing constitutional principles such as transparency and legal certainty, 
reference to these principles should be made in the Introduction of the notice. Such 
references are often found in communications and notices issued in the area of 
competition law and we see no reason for this practice not to be more frequent also 
in the area of State aid. This will offer both the necessary grounding of policy 
documents in hard constitutional principles, and will inject a welcomed rights-
oriented approach in the State aid decisional practice of the Commission. Thus, the 
second sentence of the fifth paragraph could start as follows (in italic): 
‘Article 107(1) TFEU defines State aid as any aid granted by a Member State 
or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or 
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods in so far as it affects trade between Member 
States. In the interest of transparency and legal certainty, the present 
Communication will clarify the different elements which, according to the 
case-law, constitute a State aid pursuant to that provision: the existence of 
an undertaking, the imputability of the measure to the State, its financing 
through State resources, the grant of an advantage, the selectivity of the 
measure and its potential effect on competition and trade within the Union.’  
                                                 
1
 See for instance Judgment in Case C-313/90 CIRFS v. Commission [1993] ECR I-1125, para. 36; Judgment in 
Case C-311/94 IJssel-Vliet v. Minister van Economische Zaken [1996] ECR I-5023, para. 41; Judgment in Case C-
91/01 Italy v. Commission [2004] ECR I-4355, para. 45; Judgment in Joined Cases C-75/05 and C-80/05 
Germany v. Kronofrance [2008] ECR I-6619, para. 61. 
2
 See Judgment in Joined Cases C-189, 202, 205, 208 & 213/02 Dansk Rørindustri and others v Commission 
[2005] ECR I-5425, para.211. 
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3. SEVERABILITY OF ECONOMIC/NON ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES 
3.1. In the interest of legal certainty, the Commission should insist more on the 
severability of economic/non-economic activities under the ‘general principles’of 
section 2 of the Draft Notice. Thus, paragraph 10 is currently underdeveloped, and 
might read as follows:  
‘Third, the classification of an entity as an undertaking is always relative to a 
specific activity. An entity that carries out both economic and non-economic 
activities is to be regarded as an undertaking only with regard to the former.  
In order to determine the severability of economic activities from the main 
non-economic objective pursued by an entity, the Commission looks at 
different indicators, such as: 
- the list of activities authorized by the act establishing 
the entity,  
- whether the entity can freely set the price for the 
goods and services it offers,  
- whether the secondary economic activities undertook 
by the entity are essential for the achievement of the main 
non-economic objective of the entity.’3 
3.2. Paragraph 13 states that ‘the question whether a market exists for certain 
goods and services may depend on the way those services are organized in the 
Member State concerned and may thus vary from one Member State to another.’ 
However, the case law4 suggests rather the opposite, as the European notion of 
economic activity should be interpreted in the same way in all Member states. The 
presence of an economic activity may depend on the fact that an activity can be 
delivered by private operators, which in turn may be inferred from the way the 
service is organized in other Member States. Thus, what paragraph 13 presents as 
the principle is rather the exception which only applies in certain specific sectors, 
like social security, where the Court has decided to depart from the general 
principle. Paragraph 15 becomes redundant in this context and should be deleted. 
The specificity of certain sectors can be made clearer later on, as discussed below in 
our submission under point 3.5. 
                                                 
3
 Judgment in Case T-347/09 Germany v Commission [2013] nyr, para 34-42. 
4
 Judgment Case C-41/90 Höfner [1991] ECR I-01979. 
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3.3. Furthermore, having a separate subsection 2.2 titled ‘Exercise of public 
powers’ appears rather artificial, given that it is the logical complement of the 
Höfner rule. We therefore suggest merging section 2.2 with section 2.1. 
3.4. In the same vein, we suggest deleting paragraph 19 that has essentially the 
same content as paragraph 10 discussed above. Paragraph 19 is inherently 
redundant, in that it mentions in the first sentence that ‘In so far as a public entity 
exercises an economic activity which can be separated from the exercise of public 
powers, that entity, in relation to that activity, acts as an undertaking.’ We believe it 
is of little value to mention, in the second sentence that ‘if that economic activity 
cannot be separated from the exercise of public powers, the activities exercised by 
that entity as a whole remain connected with the exercise of those public powers 
and therefore fall outside the notion of undertaking.’ Thus, the second sentence of 
Paragraph 19 is implied in the first, and overemphasizing these points is of little use, 
especially because no clarification is given as to the criteria that might be employed 
in order to determine whether the exercise of public powers/economic activities 
can be separated. 
3.5. A new sentence should be added at the end of the new section 2.1, along 
these lines: 
‘The case law of the Court clarifies that the application of the notion of 
economic activity in specific sectors is subject to the following rules.’  
3.6. The notice can then go on to the new section 2.2 Social Security, 2.3. Health 
care; 2.4 Education, research activities; 2.5. Infrastructure. 
3.7. Paragraph 16 is rather ambiguous, as it does not explain to what extent the 
interpretation of Court of the notion of economy/non-economic activities in the 
context of internal market, competition and State aid is different. Further 
explanations are needed in this regard – or alternatively the paragraph should be 
deleted altogether. This is especially so as many footnotes in Section 2 of the draft 
Notice, refer interchangeably to internal market/competition case law suggesting 
an identical application. 
3.8. The last statement in paragraph 28 with regards to independent pharmacies 
could be complemented to reference to the Judgment in Case T-23/09 Conseil 
National de l’Ordre des Pharmaciens (CNOP) and Conseil Central de la Section G de 
l’Ordre National des Pharmaciens (CCG)/Commission, [2010] ECR II-05291 para. 71. 
3.9. There is further ambiguity in paragraph 31 of the draft Notice, as the first 
sentence talks about services financed predominantly by parents or pupils, and the 
second sentence gives the example of higher education financed entirely by 
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students. We believe that in order to ensure consistency, the second sentence 
should also refer to services predominantly financed by students.  
3.10. Footnotes 46 and 47 in paragraph 33 refer solely to the framework on R, D&I. 
We wonder as to the utility of paragraph 33, given that it only restates existing 
Commission documents, without amending them or without referring to the case 
law.  
3.11. Paragraph 36 mentions that the Commission will not put into question 
measures definitely adopted before the Aéroports de Paris judgment, due to the 
uncertainty existing prior to that ruling. In this connection, footnote 51 refers to a 
Commission decision. However, the Commission does not have the competence to 
decide to limit in time the consequences of judgments issued by the Court. Such 
limitation was implied in the Leipzig/Halle ruling itself, when the Court decided that 
the application of State aid rules to airports cannot be excluded anymore as of 
2000. Thus, the Commission might want to refer to the Leipzig/Halle judgment 
instead of its own decisional practice (T-443/08, para. 106 upheld in appeal 
judgment C-288/11 P, paras. 38-39). 
3.12. Paragraph 38 would benefit from a case law reference alongside the 
reference to the Commission decisional practice in footnote 53. We would also 
suggest moving this paragraph up, and inserting it in the general remarks of 
paragraph 34.  
3.13. It is surprising to read in footnote 54 that the economic use of the 
infrastructure may be considered ancillary when the capacity allocated each year to 
such activity does not exceed 15% of the infrastructure’s overall annual capacity. In 
particular, we are wondering whether a reference could be included here, in order 
to account for the 15% figure.  
4. STATE RESOURCES: 
4.1. Section 3.2 as currently drafted is underdeveloped. It does not cover the 
existing case law; it is too short and does not offer enough guidance. The section 
creates the false impression that it is straightforward to establish whether an 
advantage was granted directly or indirectly through State resources. 
4.2. As it currently stands, Paragraph 53 might be changed as to better reflect the 
case law of the court as follows: 
‘Imposing a potential burden on State resources in the future, by a guarantee 
or by a contractual offer, is sufficient for the purposes of Article 107(1), 
provided that a sufficiently direct link is established between, on the one 
hand, the advantage given to the beneficiary and, on the other, a reduction 
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of the State budget or a sufficiently concrete economic risk of burdens on 
that budget.’5 
4.3. Paragraphs 55 and 57 lay down the same principle, and should be merged. 
Furthermore, they do not find unequivocal support in the case law. The reference to 
the granting of exclusive or special rights without remuneration as constitutive of 
aid may also be misleading, since in almost all cases such granting is done by the 
State in its role of regulating the market and therefore falls outside the scope of 
Article 107(1) - as implied by paragraph 56 - and is instead covered by 106(1) TFEU.  
4.4. Footnote 83 would benefit from clarifying in which way Case C-279/08 differs 
from the other cases mentioned in that footnote. In particular, a sentence would be 
welcomed here stating the criteria that might be employed in order to determine 
regulatory reasons justifying certain State measures. 
4.5. The reference to the ESM in paragraph 61 appears rather surprising, as it 
includes considerable crystal ball gazing. We suggest either to delete it, or to add 
further explanations as to why does the Commission find this example particularly 
relevant in this context.  
4.6. Subsection 3.2.3 of the Draft Notice could be amended in order to reflect 
recent case law developments, in particular C-262/12 Association Vent de Colère (19 
December 2013, nyr). As mentioned in paragraph 27 of that judgment, the fact that 
the undertakings retain a part of the chargers received from final consumers, with 
the result that part of the funds is not channeled through a private or public entity, 
is not sufficient to exclude there being an intervention through State resources. This 
statement appears to challenge the views expressed by the Commission in 
paragraphs 63-66 of the Draft Notice. Indeed, it seems that the role of a public of 
private entity designated to channel resources to beneficiaries is overemphasized in 
the test suggested by the Commission in its Draft Notice.  
We suggest the following amendment to Paragraph 63 of the Notice: 
‘Regulation that leads to financial redistribution from one private 
entity to another without any further involvement of the State does 
not, in principle, entail a transfer of State resources, if the money 
flows directly from one private entity to another, without passing 
through a public or private body designated by the State to 
administer the transfer, and without the sums in question remaining 
under public control and available to the national authorities’. 
                                                 
5
 Judgment in Joined Cases C-399 & 401/10 P, Bouygues SA and Bouygues Télécom SA v. European 
Commission, judgment of 19 March 2013, nyr., para 109. 
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Paragraph 65 can be amended as follows:  
‘However, State resources are present where a part or all the charges 
paid by private persons transit through a public or private entity 
designated to channel them to the beneficiaries.’ 
Paragraph 66 may be completed by adding the following sentence:  
‘A mechanism for offsetting in full surcharges imposed by law on 
undertakings that is financed by final consumers may be considered 
an intervention through state resources, even if not all the charges 
paid by private persons transit through a public or private entity 
designated to channel them to the beneficiaries.’ 
4.7. Paragraph 70 is slightly confusing as it seems to convey the idea that the 
notion of advantage might be assessed by reference to undertakings active in other 
Member States. It could be clarified as follows: 
‘The notion of advantage is based on an analysis of the financial situation of 
an undertaking in its own legal and factual context existing in its own 
Member State, with and without the particular measure.’ 
4.8. Last sentence of paragraph 72 should be redrafted in order to convey a more 
accurate description of the Commission competence in the area of Article 107 (1). 
We suggest replacing ‘spelt out these conditions’ with ‘interpreted these 
conditions.’ 
4.9. Paragraphs 74 and 75 are unclear as they do not lay down the criteria to 
distinguish between indirect advantages and secondary economic effects inherent 
in State aid measures. 
5. THE MEO TEST 
5.1. Paragraph 84 advances a kind of ‘pollution principle’: once State aid has been 
granted to an undertaking, the Commission appears to believe that any subsequent 
interventions taking place within a relatively short period of time should be also 
considered to be State aid. Such assumption is not supported by the case law, and, 
in this context, the general terms in which paragraph 84 is drafted are problematic. 
We recommend that the Commission makes clear that a case by case assessment 
needs to be done for each measure, regardless of the frequency of State 
interventions.  
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5.2. Paragraph 91: current decision making practice appears not to be entirely 
supportive of the presumption that sales and purchases done in compliance with 
public procurement directives are automatically in line with market conditions.6 
Furthermore, consistency with the rules contained on the SGEI package7 should be 
ensured. 
5.3. Paragraphs 103 and 105 do not contain any references and they do not 
reflect the margin of appreciation recognized in the case law to Member States with 
regards to benchmarking. When there is a range of possible values there is no need 
to determine, as stated in the notice, one single acceptable value (being the average 
or the median). As far as we know such a proposition does not have any support in 
the case law. Instead, according to the case law, the Member State has a margin of 
discretion in order to choose within the different reasonably acceptable values. This 
point is contained in the 1993 manufacturing Communication (Commission 
communication Application of State aid rules to public undertakings in the 
manufacturing sector; OJ C 307, 13.11.1993, p. 3–14, paragraphs 27 to 29) whose 
content should be incorporated. References to the Case law confirming this margin 
of appreciation by the Member State should also be included: Case C-256/97, DM 
Transport [1999] ECR I-03913, para 30; case C-73/11 P Frucona Kosice, 24 Jan 2013, 
nyr. 
5.4. Typo in paragraph 103: delete ‘or not’ before the first comma in sentence 
two. 
5.5. Paragraph 105 rightly recognizes ‘the specific features of the sector’ as one of 
the factors to take into account in order to determine what would be the normal 
expected return. However, it would be appropriate to include here a reference to 
the case law: for instance the judgment in cases T-228 and 233/99 WestLB [2003] 
ECR II-00435 para 255; case C-405/11P Buczek, 21 March 2013, nyr. para 46.  
6. SELECTIVITY STEMMING FROM DISCRETIONARY ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES 
6.1. Paragraph 125 appears too broad. Given that in the fiscal area it is quite 
usual to require administrative authorizations for different types of relief, the 
Commission might want to clarify more the boundaries of administrative discretion. 
The Court of Justice case law indicates the criteria that need to be satisfied by 
Member States in order to make the exercise of administrative discretion 
                                                 
6
 Compare Commission Decision of 20/04/2005 State aid0 N 355/2004 – Belgium – PPP Antwerp airport, ref. C 
(2005) 1157 fin with N517/98, UK – South Wales European Rail Freight Terminal; NN 136/99, Germany 
(Brandenburg): services to owners of forest land; N264/2002, London Underground PPP; N46/2007, Welsh 
Public Sector Network Scheme. 
7
 See in particular paragraph 66 of SGEI Communication, cited also in footnote 146 of the draft notice on the 
notion of aid. 
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compatible with EU law. Thus, the notice should reflect the fact that the system 
needs to be based on ‘objective, non-discriminatory criteria which are known in 
advance, in such a way as to circumscribe the exercise of the national authorities’ 
discretion, so that it is not used arbitrarily. Such a system must furthermore be 
based on a procedural system which is easily accessible and capable of ensuring that 
a request for authorisation will be dealt with objectively and impartially within a 
reasonable time and refusals to grant authorisation must also be capable of being 
challenged in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.’8 
7. MATERIAL SELECTIVITY FOR MEASURES MITIGATING THE NORMAL CHARGES OF 
UNDERTAKINGS 
7.1. Paragraphs 129-131 are most unclear and might attract controversy. We 
wonder in particular what the value of these paragraphs is. Indeed, paragraph 129 
does not explain where the three steps analysis does not apply. In reference to the 
Gibraltar case, the Commission indicates in paragraph 130 that ‘verification’ needs 
to be done presumably in order to check whether the design of tax/levy system is 
not arbitrary or biased. However, the Commission does not specify the criteria for 
such verification, and we wonder whether establishing clear cut criteria to this 
effect is at all possible.  
7.2. It seems that the Commission wished to single out Gibraltar as an exceptional 
case in the Notice. We are not convinced that such an approach will be beneficial, 
given that a different reading can be given to this judgment, as a rather general 
application of the principle of equality. Thus, in the interest of legal certainty, we 
suggest deleting paragraphs 129-131 altogether from the final notice. 
8. REFERENCE SYSTEM IN RELATION TO SELECTIVITY 
8.1. The last sentence of Paragraph 134 refers to two paragraphs in the notice 
which do not directly concern the subject matter. It would be better to directly refer 
to cases that the Commission thinks relevant in this point.  
8.2. Footnote 195 does not seem particularly accurate as it includes a very broad 
statement in its first sentence and it gives the false impression that judgment in 
Paint Graphos is an exception to the rule.  
8.3. Paragraph 152 would benefit to a footnote referring to the Judgment in 
Joined Cases T-211 & T 215/04, Gibraltar and UK v. Commission, [2008] ECR II-3745, 
para 106, containing the definition of the expression ‘to offset’.  
                                                 
8
 Judgment in Case C-157/99 Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473 par. 90; Judgment in Case C-203/08 
Sporting Exchange Ltd, trading as ‘Betfair’ v Minister van Justitie [2010] ECR I-04695, par.50. 
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8.4. In paragraphs 140 and 161 the Commission relies on an existing judgment 
(Paint Graphos) that specifically mentions the principle of proportionality when 
assessing whether derogatory measures are consistent with the logic and general 
scheme of the tax system. However, we consider paragraphs 140 and 161 
dangerously close to be ultra vires, to the extent that they generalize a single 
pronouncement that was strictly cast in terms of guidance to the referring court, as 
to introduce a proportionality assessment under Article 107(1). Proportionality is a 
test that generally applies whenever Member States want to justify measures that 
fall in the ambit of Article 107 (1) prohibition, and thus it needs to be carried out 
under paragraphs 2 and 3 of that Article. It is not clear whether the Commission is 
introducing a subjective element within paragraph 1 of Article 107 TFEU. 
Consequently, it would appear that Member States are required to carry out a 
proportionality test within the notion of aid itself. 
8.5. Paragraph 166 mentions that amnesty measures might be considered as 
general measures. Such statement does not reflect reality because amnesty 
measures are by excellence selective. Indeed, the beneficiaries of amnesty 
measures are those companies that have not been abiding the law, and they are 
clearly singled out by this attribute. The paragraph does not refer to case law, but 
only to Commission decisional practice, and the reference is therefore quite weak.  
9. DISTORTION OF COMPETITION AND EFFECT ON TRADE 
9.1. Para 196 refers to the idea that in certain cases ‘due to their specific 
circumstances, certain activities had a purely local impact and consequently did not 
affect trade between Member State’. The Commission then merely lists a series of 
its decisions. It might be advisable to cast this section of the draft Notice within the 
EU courts case law. First it should be restated that the there is a specific duty for the 
Commission to provide reasons on why effects on intra-Community trade and 
competition can in certain cases ‘less immediate and even less discernible.’9 The 
Commission by analogy with recent case law on free movement should discharge its 
duty by providing ‘conclusive evidence’10 which could include reliable estimates, 
figures and even patterns of trade.11 
9.2. Paragraph 195, second sentence might read: ‘However, evidence must be 
brought that the aid is such as to be liable to affect trade between Member States 
and to distort competition.’ 
  
                                                 
9
 Judgment in Case C-494/06 Commission v Italy and Wam, [2009], E.C.R. I-3639, para. 62, nyr. 
10
 Judgment in Case C-400/08 Commission v Spain [2011] ECR I-1915, par.62. 
11
 Judgment in Case C-147/03 Commission v Austria [2005] ECR I-5969, paras 64-66. 
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10. SCOPE OF THE NOTICE 
10.1. Paragraphs 198 and 199 include crucial provisions, and should be more 
precise. We would like to make the following observations:  
a. ‘repeal’ is a slightly infelicitous choice of word, as it suggest potentially 
overreaching effects of a mere soft law instrument; 
b. in the interest of legal certainty it would be advisable either to mention what 
are the particular Communications that the present notice replaces, or to delete 
the paragraph altogether. In particular, the expression ‘any contrary statements’ 
in paragraph 199 is rather unclear, it does not have any legal meaning, and sits 
oddly after a strong legal word such as ‘repeal.’ 
c. It would have been desirable to incorporate in the current notice previous 
notices that have proven to be very useful, such as the notice on 
manufacturing.12  
 
 
London, 14 March 2014. 
  
                                                 
12
 Commission communication to the Member States - Application of Articles 92 and 93 of the EEC Treaty and 
of Article 5 of Commission Directive 80/723/EEC to public undertakings in the manufacturing sector; OJ C 307, 
13.11.1993, p. 3–14.  
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